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Jerry Mashawt
I agree with Cass Sunstein that the time has come to develop the impli-
cations of republicanism, or "neo-republicanism," for American public
law. After all, if being a republican means having a commitment to some
version of democratic self-governance, combined with an aspiration for
collective decisionmaking that goes beyond the mere aggregation of indi-
vidual preference into some vector of "public" decisions, most of us can
easily view ourselves as republicans. The crucial question has to do with
the concrete meaning of republicanism for American public law and pub-
lic institutions.
The task for republicans involves at least two sorts of theorizing. First,
we must sort out our normative commitments and give them determinate
shape. Otherwise republicanism as a normative theory will give us no
purchase on the problems that we confront. Second, we must have a posi-
tive theory of legal and institutional dynamics. We must be able to specify
how legal and political institutions-from electoral voting to legislative
processes to judicial decisionmaking-work or can be made to work. Oth-
erwise we cannot choose rules or construct institutions that will pursue
our normative ends.
In this regard we should be alert to the experience of other movements
which favored "rational democracy." Our "progressive" forebearers surely
were as aware of the corruptions of legislative politics as are contempo-
rary neo-republicans, and surely they were as determined to attack the
evils of their day through institutional reform. And yet they were required
to confess within a few short years of the foundation of their movement
that they had seriously misunderstood the dynamics of public opinion and,
therefore, the probable effects of the principal reform strategies-direct
democracy in the form of the initiative, referendum, and recall-that they
had inherited from the populists. They were thus required to shift to a
completely new theory of how rational democracy could be constructed.'
That theory ultimately exalted a bureaucratic process that many contem-
porary critics, including neo-republicans,2 see as a major stumbling block
t William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. The disillusionment with public opinion is well illustrated by W. LIPPMAN, THE PHANTOM
PuBLiC (1925). The earlier enthusiasm for public opinion is captured in J. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN
COMMONWEALTH (3d ed. 1904), the first American edition of which appeared in 1889.
2. See, for example, Michelman, Supreme Court 1985 Term-Forward: Traces of Self-
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to the achievement of the sort of inclusionary, democratic politics that the
earlier progressive movement had been so eager to affirm.
For me, therefore, the most revealing portion of Professor Sunstein's
Article is Section III, "Implications," which asserts, however tentatively,
some of the consequences that Sunstein perceives as flowing from the nor-
mative vision of the earlier, and much more extended, part of his Article.
Indeed, I believe that to advance Sunstein's project as he defines it, one
must concentrate on applications and implications. It is here, in the con-
text of concrete rules, practices, and institutions, that both the meaning
and the acceptability of Sunstein's theory can best be evaluated.
I propose, therefore, to focus on one set of implications-what republi-
canism means or should mean for the interpretation of statutes. Indeed, I
restrict my analysis to only one or two of Sunstein's examples within that
set of issues. Despite this narrow focus, I arrive at some rather general
conclusions. First, I believe that Sunstein's abstract vision of the interpre-
tive enterprise is one that most lawyers, indeed most Americans, would
(wrongly) reject. Nevertheless, second, I think that the Sunstein model of
interpretation would, in practice, operate well within the bounds of what
most of us view as appropriate judicial conduct. Unfortunately, third, this
is not good news for Sunstein's theory. Acceptability in practice reveals
not a happy synthesis of thesis and antithesis, but the relative emptiness of
Sunstein's normative and positive vision as it is here articulated.
In the end, I conclude that Sunstein's theory operates to guide interpre-
tation only at the rather vague level of symbolic appropriateness. While to
my knowledge no interpretive theory really does more, this is a serious
problem for the general neo-republican enterprise. For, if the republican
revival is in substantial part an attempt to confront critics from both the
Right and Left who view the exercise of collective authority in American
politics and law as no more than the seizure of state power by private
interests, then a thin version of republican theory will not answer their
challenge. Indeed, it may produce extensions of the very deformations of
political life that both critics and republicans alike abhor.
I.
Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about consti-
tutional law. It must at the very least assume a set of legitimate institu-
tional roles and legitimate institutional procedures that inform interpreta-
tion. Otherwise, rudimentary questions, such as whether a particular
document presented for interpretation is a statute, or whether the presen-
tation of that document in a particular context calls for an authoritative
interpretation of it, cannot be answered. Beyond these very basic questions
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986), who begins his lament with an archtypical story of ad-
ministrative overgeneralization.
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lie many more that determine ultimately what it means to speak authori-
tatively in a legislative or in a legal-interpretive voice. Such questions can
be answered only by reference to the fundamental normative and institu-
tional attributes of the state.
With respect to most issues of statutory interpretation, of course, these
sorts of questions pass by unasked and unanswered. The interpretive
problems presented are simply not of sufficient moment to call forth an
inquiry into our most basic assumptions or theories about the constitu-
tional order. But the questions lie there, not far beneath the surface, wait-
ing to be uncovered and examined whenever the interpretive going gets
tough.
As I read his Article, Cass Sunstein invites us to imagine with him that
some, perhaps all, of the interpretive aids that we call upon in routine
interpretive situations are, or should be, attempts to capture some feature
of our constitutional order. Thus, the standard routines for giving or dis-
cerning meaning, including the rules of thumb that we call the "canons of
statutory interpretation," are to be understood as second-order constitu-
tional rules. Like the rules of a well-constructed rule utilitarian moral
system, their virtue lies in their simplicity and decisive-
ness-characteristics which limit both the decisional effort and the deci-
sional errors that we might fall into if we attempted to consult the funda-
mental features of the constitutional order directly in resolving every
legal-interpretive dispute.
As Sunstein recognizes, there is a practical problem with this vision of
canonical interpretation. The canons of construction often march in
matched pairs that point in opposite directions.' Because there is no canon
for the use of the canons-for choosing between two contradictory canons,
or a canon and its exceptions-the interpreter must consult some ground
for decision that is either separate from or lies behind the canons them-
selves. Rather than having a set of second-order rules that eliminate the
need for laborious and problematic theoretical inquiry into the nature of
the constitutional order, we seem to have a set that demands just such an
inquiry. For only an exploration of fundamental constitutive presupposi-
tions can hope to resolve the contradictory interpretive advice that the ca-
nons themselves provide.
Yet, the traditional indecisiveness of the canons need not be a roadblock
to the building of interpretive theories. Indeed, it motivates the search for
theory. And, the exploration of first principles that the canons seem to
demand of us might lead to any number of outcomes. We might conclude
that the canons, or some of them, are not really crystallized rules of thumb
reflecting some sense of constitutional appropriateness, but instead are
3. See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
how Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
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vestiges of other nonconstitutional considerations. We might discover some
constitutional theory that explodes the contradictions that we think we see
in the canons and that provides a convincing unification of the interpretive
maxims that history has handed down to us. We might, on the other
hand, discover that the canons and their contradictions are just an all-too-
accurate reflection of the underlying theoretical disarray that is the truly
basic characteristic of our legal order. Or, again, we might find that we
have a satisfactory constitutional theory, but one that cannot happily make
room for all the approaches that are embodied in the canons of statutory
construction. On this latter view we would then have a normative basis for
choosing amongst the canons-favoring those that seem to implement the
basic principles of our constitutional order and rejecting those that do not.
As I read his Article, it is this last position that Sunstein wants to take
up. For him, a "modern" or "neo" republican normative theory best ex-
plains our constitutional arrangements and aspirations. It is from the
standpoint of this theory that we can both understand the underlying pur-
poses of some of our canons of construction and discern which of them
may be valuable and which may be misleading guides to the interpretation
of statutes. The approach suggested thus has both positive/explanatory
and normative/decisional elements. We should try to understand individ-
ual canons as if they supported republican principles. If they cannot be
understood in this way, they either must be rejected or defended on some
other ground.
Stated in this way, the Sunstein argument has much to commend it. It
recognizes both the need to ground interpretive approaches in the norms
and structures of the Constitution and the need to pursue interpretation in
terms of some decisional directives that are more precise and meaningful
than a vague injunction to "interpret in the light of our constitutional
presuppositions." Sunstein's choice of normative foundations is also attrac-
tive. He sets out an abstract version of liberal, democratic republicanism
that resonates both with much of modern constitutional practice and with
modern understandings of the constitutional aspirations of 1787. For Sun-
stein, statutory interpretation is the pursuit of the public interest.
At this level, Sunstein's argument has the added attraction of providing
an alternative to the rather depressing interpretive paradigms recently
proposed by scholars heavily influenced by the public choice literature of
the past four decades." For these scholars the image of the legislature is
the image of private contract. Legislation is but a set of "deals" between
interest groups and re-election-oriented politicians. As such, it aggregates
without synthesizing, it compels without expressing. Interpretation, on
this view, is only the discernment of the precise degree to which state
4. E.g., Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CM. L. REV. 533 (1983); Posner, Statutory Inter-
pretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHM. L. REV. 800 (1983).
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power has been aligned to private interests. And in this vision of legisla-
tion, the public choice scholars of the Right tend to join forces with the
"crits" of the Left.5 Sunstein here seems to have embarked on the project
of preserving an idealistic and reformist center.'
Hence, I, for one, want to believe the Sunstein story-to be convinced
that his is the true, at least the best, vision of how statutes should be
interpreted. But there is much work left to be done. In this brief Com-
ment, of course, we cannot really begin to dissect all the problematics of
what I am calling the "as if republican" approach to statutory interpreta-
tion. Let me therefore concentrate on two sets of issues that seem to me to
be central to a convincing and workable theory. The first set addresses the
basic stance of the interpreter. What is the function of the interpreter?
What is it that he, she, or it thinks it is doing? Can we give a convincing
account of why that function or interpretive role is appropriate in our
constitutional system?
The second is the capacity of the normative framework to do some in-
terpretive work. A strong form of interpretive work, for example, would
be a capacity to decide hard cases. A weaker version of interpretive effi-
cacy might be the normative framework's capacity to confine interpretive
results within some subset of possible outcomes, all of which are constitu-
tionally appropriate. Weaker yet would be a capacity merely to focus in-
terpretive issues in distinctive and symbolically appropriate ways. As the
form of interpretive work weakens, of course, so does the power and at-
tractiveness of the theory.
Indeed, as we shall see, a theory that does little interpretive work may
be inadequate both to inform and to sustain the interpretive role that the
theory simultaneously affirms. This is, I fear, the problem with Sunstein's
scheme and is why a focus on interpretive implications has much to tell us
about his basic theory of republicanism itself. The two sets of issues thus
are connected, but for now let me take them up in turn.
5. See, e.g., Hutchinson & Morgan, The Semiology of Statutes, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 583
(1984); Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981).
The latter participate in a long tradition which includes such classics as C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1913) and E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-
SOVEREIGN PEOPLE (1960). There is, of course, no necessary connection between either the analytic
methodology of public choice or the deconstructionist methodology of much of critical legal theory and
particular political commitments. See, e.g., Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV.
713 (1985) (harnessing public choice ideas to an interventionist political agenda). Nevertheless, there
is a conventional contemporary association of these methodological and political postures to which the
text subscribes.
6. He is not the first in recent years to stake out this territory in relation to statutory interpreta-
tion. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873 (1987);
Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest
Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
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II.
The idea of the function of the interpreter is not at all easy to unpack.
Interpreters come in many shapes and sizes-individuals, private collectiv-
ities, and coordinate and subordinate officials, to name but the major cate-
gories. Is a theory of interpretation to give the same or a different answer
to the question of the interpretive function for all of these different inter-
preters? But perhaps we can put this particular puzzle aside for the mo-
ment, for Sunstein's analysis seems to imagine that the interpreter is a
court, perhaps the Court. What then is the judicial role as statutory inter-
preter, or, more precisely, what is the judicial role as a statutory inter-
preter in a republican polity?
The general features of Sunstein's answer are not difficult to discern.
Republican courts are "to use interpretation to guard against or limit...
possible malfunctions in the legislative process."'7 This is the role that
Sunstein sees for some existing canons and, certainly, for some new ones
that he suggests. Indeed, the task of developing new canons may be a large
one because "it would be surprising if existing canons of construction
were sufficient."' The role of judicial interpretation thus seems to be a
form of republican monitoring. Judicial interpretation and judicial review
are largely congruent if not identical. In both, courts police legislative ac-
tivity to avoid anti-republican results.
In terms of practical effect, of course, monitoring legislative outcomes
via judicial review and judicial interpretation are generally thought to be
different. According to the conventional wisdom, interpretation is a
weaker, less intrusive form of judicial action. Yet, the opposite position is
equally plausible. Interpretive monitoring can be both more powerful and
more creative than judicial review. After all, a reviewing court finding a
legislative malfunction merely nullifies the law. The republican inter-
preter goes one step further, substituting an appropriately republican
norm for the "defective" one placed before it by the legislature. Here "as
if republican interpretation" begins to take on a vaguely sinister meaning.
The interpreter, construing the statute as if it had been enacted by a re-
publican legislature pursuing the public good, may transform the actual
legislature into one almost purely hypothetical.
To be sure, this need not always be the case in Sunstein's system. Some
of his republican guides to interpretation merely constrain the reach of
statutes. For example, some rules counsel narrow construction of appro-
priations bills, procedural requirements, and potentially pre-emptive fed-
eral legislation, or of statutes arguably conferring broad discretion on ad-
ministrators to decide questions of high political moment. Here republican
interpretive monitoring acts only as a partial veto or invalidation, like a
7. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1582 (1988).
8. Id at 1583.
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limited form of judicial review. Other suggestions are more activist; inter-
pretive monitoring for "proportionality" or "coherence" would seem to
have the effect of rewriting statutory provisions to "republicanize" them.
When Sunstein speaks of his "principle of proportionality,"" for exam-
ple, he cites as a case implicitly accepting his approach the famous OSHA
benzene decision, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute.10 One common understanding of the Supreme
Court's judgment in that case, the view Sunstein seems both to hold and to
applaud, is that the Court rewrote the Occupational Safety and Health
Act in order to avoid affirming what it perceived to be an unreasonably
costly health regulation. Sunstein's approach thus seems to imply a strong
form of judicial lawgiving.
There was certainly no reason, for example, for Congress to have antic-
ipated that the Supreme Court would add a "significant risk" require-
ment to the Occupational Safety and Health Act, even if it were well
understood that the proportionality principle was to function as a back-
ground guide to statutory interpretation. After all, the litigants in that
case were busy attempting to structure the issue of proportionality around
the quite separate question of whether the definitions section of the Act
implied a demand for a cost-benefit calculation."1 Hence the "benzene
case" itself demonstrates that the opportunities for creative interpretation
of the terms of statutes to move them in the direction of the proportional-
ity principle are quite substantial. Moreover, if we are to understand the
proportionality principle as constitutionally based, then presumably a stat-
ute attempting to instruct the courts to ignore questions of proportionality
(as the Occupational Safety and Health Act arguably did)1" or any other
republican principle would raise serious constitutional questions. Such a
statute itself should therefore be subjected to an interpretation that would
induce a republican spin, perhaps, for example, by limiting the instruction
to those circumstances in which the legislative intent to violate republican
principles is "clear." It will be difficult under this theory for the actual
legislature to avoid becoming a hypothetical one.
Given the common assumption in our legal system that the role of the
judiciary in statutory interpretation is something like "behaving as a faith-
ful agent of the legislature," Sunstein's suggestions may be viewed by
many with considerable alarm. But I do not want to be counted in that
number. For I believe that there are good reasons for taking the sort of
approach to the judicial role that Sunstein's republican interpretive
9. Id.
10. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
11. This was the theory on which the case was decided below, and one which had somewhat
greater textual support in the statute itself. Industrial Union Dep't AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Inst., 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978).
12. The Supreme Court later held that no cost-benefit requirement should be read into the Act.
See American Textile Mfg. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
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scheme seems to imply. Indeed, I believe that the common faithful agency
idea can never be much more than a starting point for interpretation. It
ceases to be informative as soon as it is needed-whenever there is some
reason for the agent to wonder what the principal meant. And the occa-
sions for such wonderment are ubiquitous.
Consider how rapidly context begins to overwhelm text as the faithful
agent begins to interpret. It is not possible to imagine an interpretive role
of the conventional "faithful-agency" sort without also imagining that the
agent must interpret its instructions against the background of a set of
understandings concerning its principal. Even if one believes that these
background understandings lie firmly in the background, waiting to be
called forth only to resolve interpretive conundra (usually spoken of as
"gaps"), the idea of a conundrum, gap, ambiguity, or whatever is not self-
defining. What the text says and where it is silent, vague, contradictory,
incoherent or ambiguous thus also is a function of the application of the
background norms or principles-the contextual understandings within
which any interpretive enterprise goes forward. These contextual under-
standings must bring into play the way in which the constitutional order
defines or conceives of the legislative function.
This leads to the realization that the faithful agent is one who is faith-
ful to the principal as a legitimate lawgiver within the constitutional pol-
ity-to the legislature as constitutionally conceived or imagined. The
judge as interpreter must consider how the constitutional order conceives
of both the judicial and the legislative roles, as well as how those institu-
tions are meant to interact. The judge as monitor or creative lawgiver,
thus, is not sharply distinguishable from the judge as faithful agent of the
legislature. In case of doubt, the judge should imagine a legislature (prin-
cipal) going about its rightful business in a constitutionally appropriate
manner.
Indeed, if one believed that the legislature were structured to act and
intended to behave as a good republican legislature, then "as if republi-
can" interpretation would be grounded precisely in a combination of those
empirical beliefs and a normative belief that the court should behave as a
faithful agent of the legislature. The judicial interpreter as a corrector of
republican legislative malfunctions would be nothing more, on this view,
than an agent who is alert to the ever-present possibility that a too literal
or too nonreflective following of the principal's instructions might seri-
ously disserve the principal's underlying purposes or values.
Moreover, and I take this to be Sunstein's point, one can give a norma-
tive justification for "as if republican" interpretation. If it is the case that
our constitutional system aspires to republican principles and that the
structure of government is devised to support and defend those principles,
then it should also be the case that the separation of powers (including not
just judicial review but also judicial interpretation and application of the
[Vol. 97: 16851692
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law) is a part of that scheme of republican aspiration and defense. Even
for a court acting as a "faithful agent of the legislature," the Constitution
commands that a vision be taken of the legislature, a vision that grants the
legislature its proper place in the constitutional scheme. In a republican
polity that place is the place of a republican assembly.
In this way, Sunstein's approach is quite reminiscent of other recent
attempts at the development of theories of statutory interpretation. The
distinctive feature of Sunstein's approach is that it goes beyond Calabresi's
"fit"'" or Dworkin's "integrity" 14 or Macey's notion of "ordinary inter-
pretation"' 5 to specify a normative scheme that allows us to see the legal
system whole. As in the Calabresi, Dworkin, or Macey systems, the inter-
preter's role is to fit particular bits of legal materials, including statutes,
into the fabric of the legal order. Sunstein's fabric just has a particular
texture and hue-republicanism.
One may, of course, reject all wholistic visions of the legal system. One
might also take the view that even if the Constitution presumes that the
legal fabric comprises a whole rather than bits and pieces or rags and
stitches, that it is not the republican whole that Sunstein describes. But
these are not issues that we can or need explore in this comment. Suffice it
for now to say that there is an implicit and a quite convincing justification
for Sunstein's "republican monitoring" view of the judicial role in statu-
tory interpretation. "Monitoring" seems to be implied by any vision of the
legal system that sees it as a whole and that sees interpretation as the
inevitable device through which that "wholeness" is maintained. And,
given the usual association of republican ideas with concepts like "disin-
terestedness" and "the public interest,"'16 Sunstein's insistence on republi-
canism as supplying the appropriate normative commitments for the inter-
preter goes some way toward answering a question that other theorists
leave largely open: Why is coherence, whether styled as "fit," "integrity,"
or "ordinary interpretation," the crucial criterion of interpretive ade-
quacy? In a republican legal system, a system focused on "the common
good," the answer is obvious. A normatively fragmented legal system is
simply inconsistent with the maintenance of the republican ideal of delib-
erative consensus. It is anti-republican, or at least non-republican.
And yet, having come this far with Sunstein, I fear that his project
founders. Sunstein's particular brand of republicanism seems to me too
vague a principle to do the work that is required for the unification of a
presumptively wholistic legal order. Moreover, even where the value ma-
13. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
14. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
15. Macey, supra note 6.
16. See generally Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution, in
BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY
69 (R. Beeman, S. Botein & E. Carter eds. 1987).
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trix is reasonably determinate, it is far from clear what set of second order
rules of interpretive practice, "canons" in Sunstein's terminology, would
effectively implement those norms. And if these things are true, then the
path that we have just traversed to the justification of Sunstein's judge as
monitor has also been cut off. If republicanism is vague in the abstract
and ambiguous in application, then it cannot justify or necessitate the role
of the monitor. It is precisely this problem with Sunstein's republicanism
that is highlighted by an inquiry into the second criterion for an adequate
theory of interpretation that we articulated earlier: the capacity of the
normative framework to do interpretive work.
III.
Once again, we cannot here pursue many of the issues that Sunstein's
article raises. We must be selective, and any selective discussion obviously
risks distortion. I have chosen simply to discuss the first example that
Sunstein uses to illustrate the interpretive implications of his theory. For I
believe that this example is one that many will find intuitively plausible,
and, yet, I believe it provides revealing glimpses of the twin difficulties at
the core of Sunstein's enterprise. The first concerns the possibility of giv-
ing operational content to the critical republican virtue of deliberativeness;
the second involves the interaction of the deliberative ideal with the other
values that Sunstein affirms as a part of the modern republican's
commitments.
Consider, therefore, the straightforward support Sunstein finds in re-
publican ideals for the "canon" urging narrow construction of appropria-
tions statutes. In Sunstein's view, this canon is justified by the notion that
appropriations bills are often anti-republican because the appropriations
process is "likely to be dominated by well-organized private groups"1 and
also "lacks visibility."18 My troubles with this notion are both positive
and normative. As a factual matter, I am doubtful that the malfunctions
that Sunstein perceives are sufficiently systematic to justify the canon.
More importantly, consideration of what those malfunctions or their cor-
rection might entail obscures the underlying republican values that are
being supported.
First, the positive difficulties. Surely Sunstein is right to be suspicious
of substantive provisions in appropriations measures. They do seem
"fishy" in some way. But is it in the way Sunstein suggests? I am not at
all sure. For when I think of the two or three examples that spring most
readily to my mind, they do not seem to illustrate the dangers that Sun-
stein's interpretive monitors should be concerned about.
For many years, for example, the agenda of American administrative
17. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1582.
18. Id.
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law reform was shaped by a desire to make virtually all administrative
action subject to routine forms of judicial review. 9 This reform agenda
has now largely been accomplished. One milestone in that effort, drilled
into the heads of generations of law students, was the statute providing for
judicial review of the grandfather of federal regulatory authorities, the
Interstate Commerce Commission. And the title of this landmark statute
was the Urgent-Deficiencies Act of 1913 20-an appropriations statute.
To be sure there is some tendency today to view judicial review of ad-
ministrative action as one of the tactics of disablement, if not capture, em-
ployed by well-organized private interests in their continuing politico-
legal warfare with the administrative state. But that is hardly the view
that supported the Urgent-Deficiencies Act reforms. Those provisions
were premised on a general interest in making the rule of law a practical
reality in the emerging positive or welfare state. The review provisions in
question were attached to an appropriations bill for reasons of conve-
nience. But this hardly signalled a triumph of private over general or pub-
lic interests. The provisions adopted reflected discussions concerning the
appropriate roles of regulatory commissions, specialized courts, and gener-
alist courts that had been of continuous interest both inside and outside
the Congress for a number of years.
Consider some more recent examples. In the 1980's much legislative
business is done in one or another Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA). These are, indeed, grotesquely complex statutes that literally
might include anything in the interest of reaching an acceptable overall
budget compromise. The dangers of "dealmaking" seem all too real in
these gigantic bills that few could bring themselves to read, much less
understand. Yet I wonder whether it makes sense to view such legislation
as inherently suspect. Even some of my least favorite OBRA legislation,
such as that in 1981 constraining the growth of the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) budget by making a series of substantive
entitlements changes,"1 hardly seems to fit Sunstein's vision of the hidden
special interest deal.
Indeed, the budget reconciliation process could be viewed in some sense
as an antidote to structural problems in the non-appropriations legislative
process that promote private interest control. After all, the reigning vision
of the Congress seems to be one of subcommittee governance in which
powerful chairs use their positions to protect electorally significant clien-
teles.22 If that vision is correct, the post-1974 appropriations process might
19. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965).
20. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1336, 1398 (1982).
21. Pub. L. No. 97-35, ch. 1, 95 Stat. 843, 843-60 (1981).
22. See, e.g., M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT
(1977); M. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (1981);
D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974); W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY
AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTER-
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provide one of the few occasions for the Congress to break out of this
balkanized, special-interest-dominated mold to consider an overall accom-
modation of conflicting interests subject to a global, and apparently pub-
lic-interested, budget constraint.
Even specific limitations on the regulatory jurisdiction of federal agen-
cies in appropriations riders might be given a similarly cheerful interpre-
tation. I think, for example, of the directions to the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in the late 1970's and early
1980's that none of its appropriations be used to enforce a rule requiring
that passenger cars be equipped with passive restraints.3 These riders
reflected, not subterranean special interest pleading, but the frustrations of
a significant number of representatives who found that limitations on
NHTSA's regulatory authority were essentially not discussable within the
committees and subcommittees having subject-matter jurisdiction over the
agency. The riders thus represented an opening up of an otherwise virtu-
ally dosed process to broader currents of sentiment and debate. Indeed,
because the rule in question was not yet effective, those riders were mak-
ing only a procedural and symbolic point.
To be sure, one can find appropriations measures that are within the
core of the concerns about private interest capture that Sunstein expresses.
I have no way of knowing either what the dominant pattern is in appro-
priations legislation or whether that pattern diverges systematically from
legislation generally. But my counter-examples provide some reason to
wonder whether Sunstein's canon will do more harm than good when
viewed in a republican perspective. Indeed, they lead me to question
whether a firm basis for subconstitutional interpretative rules can be de-
rived from Sunstein's restrained, balanced, and prudential approach to re-
publicanism. For that approach has at least the vices of its virtues. Its
flexibility and contextuality seem to produce radical indeterminacy. Even
if we clearly understand the norms that our interpretive theory seeks to
implement, we seem to lack a crisp positive theory of legislative institu-
tions that would guide implementation."'
Indeterminacy, unhappily, also seems to beset Sunstein's most funda-
mental normative commitments. Consider first the idea of deliberativeness
that Sunstein employs. This notion is surely familiar. At base it demands
only that political argument (and presumably political action) be some-
ESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986).
23. These "nonenforcement" riders were attached to NHTSA's appropriations legislation from
1978 to 1980. 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 61; 35 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 358-59.
24. The recent literature challenging the "public choice" or "interest group pluralist" vision of
the legislature includes: R. BOWER, I. POOL & L. DEXTER, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POL-
iCY (1963); R. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973); J. KINGDON, AGENDA, ALTERNA-
TIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1984); A. MAAS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD (1980); Pan-
ning, Formal Models of Legislative Processes, in HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH 669-97
(G. Loewenberg, S. Patterson & M. Jewell eds. 1985).
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thing more than the assertion of pre-political preferences. "Because I
want to," is just not an argument in republican discourse. Nor is "Be-
cause they wanted it" a justification for legislative provision of some good,
service, or institution. Action and argument must be oriented toward the
public interest. So far so good; indeed, I agree. But does this principle
have any interpretive bite? Does it help solve hard questions, narrow the
interpretive field, or structure interpretive analysis in a distinctive and ap-
propriate way?
I am doubtful. The one example that Sunstein cites of the application
of the amendment-by-appropriations-is-disfavored canon, TVA v. Hill,25
seems either to have nothing to do with deliberativeness or to suggest, as
our prior discussion indicated, that because deliberation about the public
interest may pursue many goals and may come in many forms, use of the
canon is as dangerous to deliberation as it is a support for it. The inter-
pretive issue in TVA v. Hill was whether Congress meant in the Endan-
gered Species Act to forbid the continuation of federal construction
projects, begun before that Act's passage and funded continuously since, in
the interest of preserving the habitat of a previously unknown species of
fresh-water perch. In one sense this issue was not difficult. The Endan-
gered Species Act contained no exceptions, and its literal terms covered the
project and species in question. The problem was that stopping the project
and forfeiting both its potential benefits and the previously expended
planning and construction funds seemed silly. The "snail darter" had no
known commercial, recreational, or other value. This pragmatic judgment
sought legal refuge in the argument that Congress had impliedly amended
the Endangered Species Act by continuing to appropriate funds for the
Telico Dam after learning of the threat the dam posed to the snail darter's
habitat.
The "canon" in question was obviously an answer of sorts to that argu-
ment. But one may certainly question whether that answer had anything
to do with deliberativeness. Although we can readily identify those who
will benefit in this instance from application or nonapplication of the ca-
non, there is no suggestion that either the federal water project or the
Endangered Species Act was "private interest" legislation. The conflict
here is between two public interests. Moreover, if deliberativeness is to be
judged by outcome-by the degree to which a statute as interpreted pro-
motes general social welfare-the application of the canon in this case
seems misplaced. Indeed, in arguing for his new canon of "proportional-
ity," which apparently entails the proposition that all statutes be viewed
as containing de minimis exceptions, 26 Sunstein himself seems to be sug-
gesting that the application of the appropriations disfavoring canon would
25. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
26. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1583.
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be wrong in a case like TVA v. Hill. At the very least, Sunstein's two
canons, both presumably favoring republican deliberativeness, point in op-
posite directions.
On reflection, this result is not too surprising. Where the criterion of a
satisfactory outcome is that a vision of the public interest is being served,
most statutory enactments pass muster. It is hardly surprising that repub-
licanism, defined as public interested results, will have this characteristic.
It will be an extremely rare case where interpretation involves choosing
between a private interest and a public interest result. Nor does Sunstein
provide any examples in which the consideration of the demands of delib-
erativeness suggest "uniquely correct outcomes," save for situations in
which such considerations lead to an invalidation of the legislation as vio-
lating one or another existing constitutional protection of individual
rights.2" And there the idea of republicanism provides no independent ba-
sis for invalidation.
Thus far, then, we have encountered the following problems in utilizing
Sunstein's republican interpretive system. First, the one "canon" that we
have analyzed in any detail might plausibly lead away from rather than
toward republican results. Second, that republican canon seems to contra-
dict another in the only example that Sunstein provides for its utilization.
And third, if we leave aside problematic and conflicting republican canons
to consult the value of republican deliberativeness directly, we seem to end
up with an interpretive guideline having the nondecisiveness of the famil-
iar post-New Deal rational basis test.
"As if republican" interpretation confronts something of a dilemma.
For the system to do a strong form of interpretive work-to decide hard
cases-it must have some rules such as the canons of construction. But
republican canons are difficult to construct because republicanism itself is
a substantive and procedural aspiration which must be pursued pruden-
tially in any legislative context. Canonical exposition of rules produces
immediate unease for an obvious reason: Hard-edged rules are procrus-
tean and acontextual. Hence a complete set of republican canons should
be expected to create choices among rules in every context-choices that
presumably can be informed only by resort to the vague contours of re-
publicanism itself. But to repair there is to abandon the hope that republi-
can interpretation will solve interpretive problems. Almost always the in-
terpretive problem is to choose between or among possible visions of the
public interest, not to find a way to suppress "malfunctions." And, if this
is true, then the interpretive stance that republicanism sought to justify
collapses. Republican interpretive monitoring can hardly be necessary to
unify a legal system within which virtually any result is acceptable.
For some this will be a virtue rather than a vice of Sunstein's vision. In
27. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1584-89.
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a sense we have come full circle from our earlier conclusion that the faith-
ful agency model of the interpreter merged imperceptibly into some form
of normative monitoring model. We can now see that, at least where
norms are as capacious as republicanism and factual contexts as indeter-
minate as our current positive theory of legislation, normative monitoring
implies judicial activism of a degree and extent that is barely distinguisha-
ble from a naive attachment to the faithful agency model.
To be sure, our discussion up to this point concerns itself with only one
of the values that inhabit Sunstein's neo-republican vision. But the justifi-
cation of "bright line" interpretive rules and the decisiveness of republi-
canism itself is not aided by adding considerations beyond "deliberative-
ness" to the value matrix. Indeed, these problems are worsened
appreciably once it is recognized that those values also require prudential
and contextual application and that their suggestions about an appropriate
interpretive posture may contradict the concrete implications of a consid-
eration of deliberativeness.
Consider, for example, a republican interpreter faced with the not un-
common problem of determining the meaning to be given to statutory
terms that seem to have been differently understood by certain members of
the House and the Senate. Does Sunstein's republican vision of the inter-
pretive enterprise tell us which house should have preference? Arguably it
does: Both. From the standpoint of deliberativeness, the Senate under-
standing would seem to have the edge-at least if we understand delibera-
tiveness to be facilitated by relative insulation from parochial political
clamor. But what about political equality, one of the other virtues Sun-
stein ascribes to republicanism? On that basis the House view should get
the nod.
Adding Sunstein's other values, universalism and citizenship, merely
deepens the puzzle. Surely the smaller and more stably composed Senate
has a better chance of achieving consensual outcomes and thus satisfying
the aspiration for "universalism" as Sunstein presents it. And, just as
surely, the House seems to represent the commitment to voter and small
unit efficacy that is said to inhabit "citizenship."
There may be convergences amongst these values that point toward a
set of uniquely republican canons of construction or that resolve particular
interpretive difficulties. But even in the abstract these values seem to push
in differing directions and to raise a host of issues concerning their mean-
ings and possible interconnections. At the level of concrete application I
am doubtful, to put it mildly, that a convergence of values will ever pro-
duce either determinate and nonconflicting canons or clear directions for
the solution of interpretive conundra. The values that Sunstein espouses
may in some sense describe a symbolically appropriate interpretive stance,
but they are unlikely to decide hard questions or, indeed, to eliminate
many plausible solutions.
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IV.
A less sympathetic critic than I am, therefore, might characterize Sun-
stein's interpretive approach as Hart and Sachs in fancy dress, or as the
constitutionalizing of the conventional wisdom. But that is to miss much of
the significance of Sunstein's article. In my view, it is of the utmost im-
portance to ground interpretation explicitly in constitutional values. More
than that, Sunstein's thesis contributes to a growing literature that at-
tempts to marry the concerns of normative constitutionalism with those of
positive political theory. Sunstein at base is asking us to consider this
question: If we aspire to be a republican polity of a certain sort, how
should we structure our electoral and legislative processes? While
Madison might not recognize the republicanism that Sunstein espouses as
his own, he certainly would recognize the issue Sunstein frames as one of
the most important and troubling that we face as we embark on our sec-
ond hundred years of republican constitutionalism.
I do not want to conclude, however, on this congratulatory note. The
question I have put in Sunstein's mouth is urgent as well as important.
More pointedly, I believe that the current form of the debate about Amer-
ican public institutions requires that the question be rephrased if it is to
identify properly the controversy that divides centrist reformers like Sun-
stein (and me) from more radical critics of the Right or Left. For the
radicals' challenge is really a challenge to the centrist vision of what it is
possible for public life to be like in a liberal democracy. If the Left is
correct, then public discourse and collective action under conditions of
capitalist economic organization and liberal democratic governance are op-
pressive and alienating. The attempted pursuit of republican values in this
context can only be an illusion. In our secular society, neo-Marxist analy-
sis might simply substitute republicanism for religion as the opiate of the
masses.
The public-choice-inspired radical Right agrees, but out of quite differ-
ent premises. Whereas the Left sees individual preferences as endogenous
to an oppressive regime and thus illusory and false as expressed through
standard democratic processes, the Right sees preferences as exogenous to
politics. More importantly for these latter theorists, the cycling problems
of majority rule and other collective choice processes (as well as the ubiq-
uity of interest group hegemony in balkanized political sub-systems) make
the construction of legitimate and defensible collective decision mecha-
nisms a virtual impossibility in the modern state. On either view, the rela-
tionship between private interests and public decisions has, and can have,
nothing to do with the alchemy of disinterested, republican consensus. To
think otherwise is to misunderstand both individual and collective behav-
ior at the most fundamental level.
The argument, then, is an argument about what the world of politics is
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or can be like. For if we misunderstand that, we misunderstand what
values it is sensible to hold or, more accurately, to seek to implement.
Indeed, the republican reformer demanding that statutes be interpreted as
if they were the product of republican institutions risks simply extending
the reach of private seizures of public power. The republican reformer
must, therefore, join issue on the facts-on the positive theory of social or
public choice.
Indeed, Sunstein himself has addressed this topic to a degree.28 But it is
not enough to claim that values are endogenous to politics. Leftist critics
will agree but will point out that that is precisely their complaint. Right
wing critics, on the other hand, will be heard to wonder what possible
difference that could make as long as preferences are not uniform or "sin-
gle-peaked." Moreover, endogeneity does not of itself equalize power or
cause effective political groups to form around even those values that are
widely shared. Thus, while one can only welcome the continued devotion
of Cass Sunstein's enormous energy and talent to the struggle to define a
plausible and attractive view of American politics and public law, one
must simultaneously note that the agenda for debate is longer than Be-
yond the Republican Revival seems to imagine. Indeed, the conversation
is hardly begun.
28. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CM. L. REV. 1129 (1986); see
also Sunstein, Naked Preferences and The Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984); Sunstein,
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
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